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2 INDUCTION AND FALSIFIABILITY IN STATISTICS
Summary: The title, a headline, and a typical one, from a newspaper’s
“Health & Wellness” section, usually written by a reporter who has
just read a medical journal, can only be the result of an inductive
argument, which is an argument from known contingent premisses to
the unknown. What are the premisses and what is unknown for this
headline and what does it mean to statistics?
The importance—and rationality—of inductive arguments and their
relation to the frequently invoked, but widely and poorly misunder-
stood, notion of ‘falsifiability’ are explained in the context of statistical
model selection. No probability model can be falsified, and no hope for
model buidling should be sought in that concept.
Key words: Falsifiability; Fisher; Induction; Model complexity; Model
selection; Occam’s razor; P-values; Popper (Karl); Skill score.
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1. Introduction
Everybody knows that
Because all the many flames observed before have been hot (1)
that this is a good reason to believe
that this flame will be hot. (2)
At least, I have never met anybody, regardless of his philosophy, who
would be willing to put his hand into a bonfire. Yet there are philoso-
phers, and statisticians, who will claim that (1) is not a good reason
to believe (2), and not only that, but also that there is no reason to
believe (2).
The argument from (1) to (2) is inductive, which as argument from
contingent1 premisses which are, or could have been, observed, to a
contingent conclusion about something that has not been, and may
not be able to be, observed. An inductive argument must also have its
conclusion say about the unobserved something like what the premisses
says about the observed. The word ‘like’ is sufficiently ambiguous, but
this has never troubled philosophers who know an inductive argument
“when they see one” [Stove, 1982].
The argument from (1) to (2) is also invalid in the strict logical
sense that the premiss does not entail the conclusion2. This should be
obvious from the example, because it is possible that the next flame
I come upon will not be hot, even though all the other flames I have
ever experienced have been.
Regardless of the common sense of (2), the early part of the 20th
century saw the beginning, growth, and dispersal of the belief that all
inductive arguments are unreasonable. Karl Popper was the philosoph-
ical father (Hume was its grandfather) of inductive skepticism. Thomas
Kuhn, Imre Lakatos, Paul Feyerabend and many others are his legti-
mate children [Theocharis and Psimopolos, 1987], children who have
been increasingly willing to lose touch with reality (this sad history
has been recounted in, among other places, Gross and Levitt [1994]).
Popper asked, “Are we rationally justified in reasoning from repeated
instances of which we have experience [like the hot flames] to instances
of which we have had no experience [this flame]?” His answer: “No”
[Popper, 1959]. This irrational answer has long been exposed for what it
is in the analytical philosophical community [Haack, 2003, Theocharis and Psimopolos,
1Not logically necessary.
2Thus, validity means only that the conclusion is logically entailed by the pre-
misses; invalid does not imply unreasonable.
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1987, Stove, 1982], but, curiously, the news of its irrationality hasn’t
reached many scientists yet.
But, to make the long story mercifully short, Popper convinced him-
self, and many others, that, since induction could not and should not
be trusted, only deduction should be used in scientific inference. And
since it is difficult to prove things positively, Popper therefore claimed
that the mark of a ‘real’ theory is that it can be falsified; theories that
could not be were said to be metaphysical and not scientific. Now,
the term falsified has a precise, unambiguous, logical meaning3, but
there are many odd, and incorrect, interpretations of this word in our
community, which I will detail below.
That the falsifiability criterion was nonsensical in the face of theo-
ries that are true, and therefore could not be falsified, never bothered
Popper. What did bother him were certain kinds of statistical theories
(probability statements) which did not seem to fit into the falsifica-
tion scheme because, of course, they could not be falsified, and were
therefore metaphysical, even though, of course, these theories are in
everyday use. He called this the ‘problem of decidability,’4 and left it
at that; or, rather, he left it for the statisticians to solve [Stove, 1982].
Fisher, though certainly not of the same skeptical bent—he often
talked about how scientists used inductive reasoning, though he wasn’t
always entirely clear by what he meant by inductive [Fisher, 1973a,b]—
agreed in principle with the Popperian ideas and used these beliefs to
build his system of statistics: theories could only be ‘rejected’ and
never verified (and so on).
My purpose of this paper is not to prove that inductive inferences are
reasonable, because that has already been done by others (summarized
in Stove [1982]), and, in any case, it is obvious to those of us not
infected by the Popperian strain. I merely want to show that the
reasoning behind most statistical methods, and certainly those of model
selection, is inductive, especially when we (civilians and statisticians)
step back from the math and try to make sense of what the data tells
us. I will also show that falsifiability is of little or no use. These two
findings, the importance of induction and the frequently futile search
for falsifiability, have important consequences for the future of our field.
3That something was shown to be certainly false.
4Stove [1982, p. 66] quotes Hume on this “custom of calling a difficulty what
pretends to be a demonstration and endevouring by that means to ellude its force
and evidence.”
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2. Common Inductive Arguments
About civilians first. Here is a typical, and schematic, newspaper
headline:
Broccoli reduces risk of splenetic fever (3)
which had to, of course, come from somewhere. It is possible, and un-
fortunately not impossible, that it came directly from the imagination
of the reporter. But it may have also come from an argument like the
following:
Broccoli either reduces risk of splenetic fever or it
does not
Broccoli reduces risk of splenetic fever. (4)
The premise is a tautology: it is necessarily true regardless of any
state of the world. Now, it is a well known principle of logic that it is
impossible to argue from a tautology or necessary truth to a contingent
conclusion. That is, (4) is invalid (and it is not inductive). It can be
made valid if the premiss were changed to:
Broccoli always prevents splenetic fever.
Evidently, the headline did not come from an argument of this sort, or
from the original premiss of (4). It is more likely that the reporter was
reading a medical journal which itself discussed evidence relevant—to
the conclusion—from an experiment or an observation on a certain–
fixed–group of people. So the reporter may have been arguing:
Of all the people—in this certain group of
people—more people who did not eat Broccoli got
splenetic fever than did people who ate Broccoli.
Broccoli reduces risk of splenetic fever. (5)
The stated premiss was, obviously, one of the facts reported in the
medical journal. But there are at least two hidden premisses our re-
porter used, whether he knew them or not: (i) that splenetic fever is
unambiguously diagnosed, and (ii) that the facts in the medical journal
are accurate. In any case, I will assume the obvious in what follows:
namely, that these, and other similar hidden premisses, are unimpor-
tant or do not conflict with the major premisses or conclusion.
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Now, (5) may be valid or invalid depending on whom broccoli re-
duces the risk and what ‘reduces risk’ means. If the ‘whom’ is “for
this certain group of people” and ‘reduces risk’ mean “less people who
ate broccoli get splenetic fever”, then (5) is valid, but it is merely a
tautology and just restates that, in this certain group of people, fewer
who ate broccoli got splenetic fever. However, it is surely false that
all newspaper headlines of this sort are tautologies that just repeat the
medical findings in different words and that the results hold only for
the certain group of people experimented upon.
Statisticians rarely go to the trouble of tabulating results, like, say,
the 2 × 2 table of broccoli and splenetic fever, and print them in a
medical journal without having more than just the certain group of
people experimented upon in mind. That is, they either want to say
something, beyond the raw numbers, about specific characteristics of
the certain group of people, or about people who are not part of this
certain group. In other words, the conclusion should more specifically
state that broccoli reduces risk of splenetic fever for
this group such that P (SF|B) < P (SF|No B). (6)
or
future groups of people not in this certain group. (7)
where the abbreviations mean the obvious. The conclusion (6) says
something about this certain group of people, but it says something
about an unobservable characteristic of these people; namely the prob-
ability of developing splenetic fever given that the people ate, or did
not eat, broccoli. (7) makes a prediction about the presence or absence
of splenetic fever for people not in this certain group.
Either conclusion, (6) or (7), make the argument invalid, but both
also make it inductive. The headline is certainly implying either (6) or
(7) or both (it may be implying (6) for future groups of people). Now,
most statistical results, at least those not reported by conscientious
statisticians, but certainly those that are found in common medical
journals etc., are like this. That is, it is not clear whether the au-
thor’s are saying something about unobservable characteristics of their
certain group of patients or making predictions about future groups
of people. The implication, I think, for most newspaper’s “Health
& Wellness” sections, is that you should increase your intake of the
vegetable/mineral/nutrient-of-the-week mentioned in the headline to
certainly avoid developing the disease or malady mentioned. Meaning,
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you are to take the headline as a prediction for you. It is unimpor-
tant whether I am right about this, or whether headlines always imply
something about unobservables—instead of making predictions about
observables in future groups—because most statisticians say something
about unobservables. But it is important that the distinction is hardly
ever noted.
And it’s especially critical to understand that whatever the headline
means, it is certainly based on an inductive argument. This is true even
if the medical journal’s authors were scrupulous in their use of classical
statistical methods, and were thus careful to say that it is impossi-
ble, based on those methods, to support any positive conclusion about
broccoli and splenetic fever. Civilians, like our reporter, just do not
understand the idiosyncratic and confusing interpretations of p-values
and confidence intervals, and they are almost certainly going to go away
from a journal believing that the evidence just gathered actually meant
something directly about the hypothesis of broccoli reducing the risk
of splenetic fever. Well, so what? You can argue (incorrectly, I think)
that we cannot be responsible for what civilians do with statistics. But
what about statisticians themselves, who do understand the complexi-
ties of classical analysis that know, say, ‘long-run’ is a euphemism for
‘infinity,’ and so on? What about their arguments?
3. Popper and Statisticians
It may be fun to play a game of Who Said It?:
(a) “We have no reason to believe any proposition about the unob-
served even after experience!”
(b) “There are no such things as good positive reasons to believe any
scientific theory.”
(c) “The truth of any scientific theory is exactly as improbable, both
a priori and in relation to any possible evidence, as the truth of a
self-contradictory proposition” (i.e. It is impossible.)
(d) “Belief, of course, is never rational: it is rational to suspend belief.”
The first is from the grandfather of inductive skepticism, David Hume
[2003]. The others are all from Karl Popper [1959, 1963]. These quo-
tations are important to absorb, because most of us haven’t seen them
before, and because of that, a lot of misperceptions about Popper’s phi-
losophy and its derivatives are common in our field. To first show the
extent of Popper’s influence, we can play another round of our game,
this time with current quotes from statisticians:
(A) “‘[I]nduction doesn’t fit my understanding of scientific (or social
scientific) inference.”
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(B) “Bayesian inference is good for deductive inference within a model.”
(my italics)
(C) “I falsify models all the time.”
(D) “[T]he probability that the ‘truth’ is expressible in the language
of probability theory...is vanishingly small, so we should conclude
a priori that all theories are falsified.”
(E) “[P]assing such a test does not in itself render [a] theory ‘proven’ or
‘true’ in any sense—indeed, from a thoroughgoing falsificationist
standpoint (perhaps even more thoroughgoing than Popper him-
self would have accepted), we can dispense with such concepts
altogether.”
(F) “A theory that makes purportedly meaningful assertions that can-
not be falsified by any other observation is ‘metaphysical.’ What-
ever other valuable properties such a theory may have, it would
not, in Popper’s view, qualify as a scientific theory.”
It isn’t hard to search for examples like this, and there is no reason
to hunt for more because these will ring true enough. The first four
quotes are from Andrew Gelman’s Columbia statistics blog [2005]; Dan
Navarro wrote the fourth on that blog [2005]; the last two are from a
review paper on Popperism in statistics by [Dawid, 2004, a paper that
also contains the line “Causality does not exist”]. (A), I trust, is true,
but it is not a statement of logic. The other comments are, or contain
logical statements, and they are false (the second sentence in (F) is a
matter of fact and is true). Before I show that, let me summarize how
Popper came to believe what he did, and how these views leaked into
statistics.
Hume (it was he who supplied the flames example which started this
paper) first to rigorously study the invalidity of inductive inferences
[Hume, 2003]. Further, he was the first to show that there was no
way to remove an inductive argument’s invalidity: he proved that no
additional, necessarily true or contingent, premisses could be added
to the original premisses that would make a given inductive argument
valid. This conclusion is known as inductive fallibilism, and is nowhere
controversial.
Hume then made an additional step and claimed to have shown that,
not only are inductive arguments fallible, but that they were also always
unreasonable. This additional conclusion was shown to hinge on two
main premisses: (i) inductive fallibilism, and (ii) deductivism, which is
that all invalid arguments are unreasonable [Stove, 1982]. Thus:
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Inductive fallibilism: inferences from the observed
to unobserved are invalid.
Deductivism: all invalid arguments are unreason-
able.
Inductive skepticism: all inductive arguments are
unreasonable.
(8)
This is a valid argument, given that both premisses are true. Again,
nobody disputes inductive fallibilism. How about deductivism? The
flames argument is inductive, therefore invalid, and by deductivism it is
unreasonable to believe that future flames will be hot. Hume assumed
that deductivism was true, but there is no argument that it is; it is
taken by him, and by Popper, to be axiomatic. However, the thesis is
plainly wrong [Stove, 1982].
Popper took inductive skepticism as his starting point. Given that
the only inferences that are reasonable are deductive ones, and because
it is, as mentioned above, impossible to argue from a necessary truth
to a contingent conclusion, and all matters of fact are contingent, it
becomes impossible to argue directly for the truth of any real-world
theory. The best that you could do is to argue negatively against it:
that is, if some theory said that “X” is true, and you directly observed
“¬X” (not X), then you could conclusively say that the theory was
false. But that was all you could do. You could never say the theory
was true, or how likely it was to be true, or whether it was reasonable
to believe a theory that was ‘not yet’ falsified, and so on. That is,
Popper argued something like this:
(8)
Theories must be falsifiable to be ‘scientific’: “It is
a vice and not a virtue for a model to be infallible.”
(9)
This reasoning, which was fully “in the air” in the early part of the
20th century, made sense to Fisher, who tried to build falsifiability into
his p-values. Where that got us as a field, by now everybody knows.
However, as I’ll show below, and as everybody already knows, p-values
cannot falsify a theory; and theories based on probabilty models cannot
be falsified, e.g. Gillies [1971] and the refutation by Spielman [1974]
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and others. It may come as a slight surprise to learn that any attempt
at using a p-value actually forces its user into making an inductive
argument, which are the very things that so horrified Popper.
4. Induction and Falsifiability in Statistics
Here are two well-known staples of logic:
p −→ q p −→ q
p ¬q
q ¬p
The first, to give it its Latin name and make it official, is modus ponens,
and is to be read “If (the predicate) p is true, then (the predicate) q is
true (or is entailed). p is true. Therefore, q is true.” The second, modus
tollens, is to be read “If p is true, then q is true. q is false. Therefore,
p is false.” It is these two classic forms, and especially the second, that
were latched onto by Popper. Modus ponens, incidentally, goes from
deductive to inductive by replacing the second premiss to “q” (though
it doesn’t keep its Latin name).
For example, a statistical model (or theory, or hypothesis) M that
is truly falsified would have a (valid) argument something like (I take,
without further elaboration a ‘model’ M to be the kind of thing that
makes statements like “M −→ q,” where M is not observable; I say
nothing here about where models come from):
M −→ P (X > 0) = 0
X > 0
¬M (10)
which is to be read “Model M entails that the probability of seeing an
(observable) X greater than 0, is 0; that is, ifM is true, it is impossible
that X > 0. We saw an X > 0. Therefore M is false.” This is great
when it happens, as M is deduced to be false, but this happens rarely
in practice, and never does in probabilty models. Consider instead this
more common argument:
M −→ P (X > 0) = ǫ > 0
X > 0
¬M (11)
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which is to be read “Model M entails that the probability of seeing an
(observable) X is small, as small as you like, but still not zero; that is,
it is merely improbable but not impossible to see an X > 0. We saw an
X > 0 (even a microscopically small X). Therefore M is false.” This
argument is not valid, but it is inductive because, of course, no matter
how small P (X > 0), an X > 0 might still happen and, when and if it
does, it is not inconsistent with M . It is no good, if you are no fan of
induction, rebutting with something on the order of, “Yes, an X > 0
is not strictly inconsistent with M , but the probability of seeing such
an X given that M is true is so small, that if we do see X > 0 then M
is practically falsified.” The term ‘practically falsified’ is meaningless
and is in the same epistemic boat as ‘practically a virgin5.’ If you
insist on something being ‘nearly’ or ‘practically falsified’, then you
are making an inductive judgment about M , and there is no disguising
that fact. Further, if you choose some cutoff, some particular ǫ, it can
be shown that you are also putting a measure of logical probability on
the inductive inference for the falsity of M [Jaynes, 2003].
Here is another example which comes close to the silliness of ‘prac-
tically falsified’ but is in fact a valid argument: “[For a series of fair
coin flips with M: P (Xi = H) = 0.5, T]he theoretical event
n−1
n∑
i=1
Xi → 0.5
has M-probability 1. Hence, as a model of the physical universe, M
could be regarded as falsfied if, on observation, the corresponding phys-
ical property, the limiting relative frequency of H in the sequence of
coin-tosses exists and equals 0.5, is found to fail” (Dawid [2004]; second
italics mine; original had ‘P’ instead of ‘M’).
This argument is valid, but it is also impossible to fulfill because
of the “on observation” phrase. Nobody will ever live to see whether
the actual limiting frequency of tosses does exist and does falsify M6.
Stopping at any finite value of tosses, no matter how large, only buys
you ‘practically falsified’, which is to say, does not buy you validity,
and leaves you holding another inductive inference.
Now, most modern probability models are put into service to say
things about unobservable parameters (call them θ). Here is one pos-
sible argument about M0 and θ, where M0 might be a ‘null’ model or
hypothesis of some kind, and θ > 0 might index some kind of test (say
5I am, it should go without saying, speaking of untouched forestland.
6This was what Keynes was getting at with his “In the long run we shall all be
dead” comment.
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the hypothesis where the mean parameters for two normal groups has
that θ = θ1 − θ2; variances known):
M0 −→ P (θ > 0|X) = 0
P (θ > 0|X) = ǫ > 0
¬M0 (12)
The model is to be read, “If M0 is true, then after I see the data the
probability of θ > 0 is 0; that is, if M0 is true it is impossible that
θ > 0. The actual probability, after seeing X , is P (θ > 0|X) = ǫ > 0.
Therefore, M0 is false.” This is a valid deductive argument. Certainly,
arguments like this can be made for many, if not all, probability models.
If this kind of argument is what the writer’s from (B) and (C) had in
mind, then I was wrong and people really are routinely engaged in valid
falsifications. And it may even be true, or ‘true’, as (D) or (E) have
it7, that all models are a priori falsified (a claim that actually begins
Dennis and Kintsch [2006]).
However, it is clear that conclusions of this type are not what our
writers do have in mind. For, we can reword the conclusion as “It is
false that I am certain that θ > 0; that is, it is false that I know for a
fact, without any uncertainty, that θ1 > θ2.” So “¬M0” merely means
“I am not certain that θ1 > θ2”, and that is all I have gained from this
argument; which is to say, I have gained nothing.
Statisiticians are not interested in models like M0, because proba-
bility models start with the tacit assumption that “I am not certain
that θ1 > θ2.” This was why an experiment was run and data was
collected in the first place. The tacit assumption is certainly true for
the ubiqutous normal model where, no matter what finite set of data
is observed, I will never be certain that “θ1 > θ2” is true or false. The
uncertainty is forever built in right at the beginning, and the only way
around it is to design a new probability model where, in fact, it is pos-
sible to have it certain that θ1 > θ2. But once that is done, it is hard
to see how any data would change that fact.
7Those extraneous marks around the true are known as scare quotes, and are a
(conscious or not) attempt by their writers to have it both way about the word in
question. For example: ‘true’ may mean true or only believed to be true, which are
as far apart in meaning as is possible. It is not clear whether Fisher would have
approved of the use of ‘true’ in this sense; we know that he used this technique at
least sometimes [Fisher, 1980, p. 334] But it is was Popper himself who was the
progenitor and true master of this form [Stove, 1982].
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It is also false that all models are a priori falsified. Presumably, for
all observation statements q, there is a true model MT . It may be, and
is even likely, that we will not accurately identify MT . This does not
mean that MT is falsified, because, of course, it is true.
The best we can do, perhaps, is to identify a set of ‘useful’ models
(where I happily leave ‘useful’ vague), none of which are equivalent
to MT (see the discussion in Bernardo and Smith [2000], chap. 6, on
“M-closed” vs. “M-complete” vs. “M-open”). It follows that if we
knew that these models were not equivalent to MT , then we would
know that the models in the useful set are falsified; in fact, they are
all falsified. But if we knew these models were not equivalent to MT ,
then we would knowMT , and it is, again of course, impossible to falsify
what is true (and we wouldn’t even bother with creating the useful set,
unless we were interested in creating, say, a computationally-simple
approximation to MT ).
Again, we usually do not know, with certainty, MT . So we cannot
say, with certainty, that the models in the alternate set are false. It
may be that some models in the set are more useful than others, and to
any degree that you like, and this may be all we can ever learn (more
on this below). But they cannot be, a priori or a posteriori, falsified.
Lastly, it worth pointing out that it is not true that we can never
know MT , else we could never, for example, create simulations! (also
pointed out in Bernardo and Smith [2000, p. 384]).
The classic argument against (but, thanks to Fisher, never for) a
model is:
M0 −→ 0 < p-value < 1
p-value is small
¬M0 (13)
which is to be read, “The (null) modelM0 entails that we see a uniformly-
distributed p-value. We see a p-value that is publishable (namely,
< 0.05). Therefore, M0 is false.” This argument is not valid and it
is not inductive either because the first premiss says we can see any
p-value whatsoever, and since we do (see any value), it is actually evi-
dence forM0 and not against it. (In fact, if the conclusion wereM0, the
argument would be inductive!) There is no p-value we could see that
would be the logical negation of “0 < p-value < 1”; well, other than
1 or 0, which may of course happen in practice8. And when it does,
8The simplest example is a test for differences in proportion from two groups,
where n1 = n2 = 1 and where x1 = 1, x2 = 0, or x1 = 0, x2 = 1.
14 INDUCTION AND FALSIFIABILITY IN STATISTICS
then regardless whether the p-value is 0 or 1, either of those values
legitimately falsify M0!
Importantly, the first premiss of (13) is not that “If M0 is true,
then we expect a ‘large’ p-value,” because we clearly do not. But the
argument would be valid, andM0 truly falsified, if the first premiss were
“M0 −→ large p-value,” but nowhere in the theory of statistics is this
kind of statment asserted, though something like it often is. Fisher
was fond of saying—and this is quoted in nearly every introductory
textbook—something like this (using my notation):
Belief in M0 as an accurate representation of the
population sampled is confronted by a logical dis-
junction: Either M0 is false, or the p-value has
attained by chance an exceptionally low value
[Fisher, 1970, for example].
(14)
His ‘logical disjunction’ is evidently not one, as the first part of the
sentence makes a statement about the unobservableM0, and the second
part makes a statement about the observable p-value. But it is clear
that there are implied missing pieces, and his quote can be fixed easily
like this:
Either M0 is false and we see a small p-value, or
M0 is true and we see a small p-value.
(15)
Or just:
Either M0 is true or it is false and we see a small
p-value.
(16)
Since “Either M0 is true or it is false” is a tautology, we are left with
We see a small p-value. (17)
Which is of no help at all. Further, this statement has the same logical
status as the a priori judgement in the conclusion of (4); or rather, the
p-value casts no direct light on the truth or falsity of M0. This result
should not be surprising, because remember that Fisher argued that
the p-value could not deduce whether M0 was true; but if it cannot
deduce whether M0 is true, it cannot, logically, deduce whether it is
false; that is, it cannot falsify M0.
However, current practice is that a small p-value is taken to be by all
civilians, and most of us, to mean “This is evidence that M0 is false.”
But that is an inductive argument like this:
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For most small p-values I have seen in the past,
M0 has been false.
I see a small p-value and my null hypothesis isM0
¬M0 (18)
This argument has seen success because p-values have been of some
use, but as we know now, it is only because, in simple situations, they
are reasonable approximations to (functions of) probability statements
of hypotheses like “θ1 > θ2 given X”, e.g. Berger and Selke [1987].
You may also try to salvage (13) by starting with Ma (or with ¬M0),
some alternate hypothesis that is not the null hypothesis. But then, of
course, you cannot say anything about a p-value.
5. Model Selection
This section is more speculative because I talk about models and
how to choose among them. I do not intend for the statements here to
be taken as proof, though I believe that the first two conclusions about
the number of models and the existence of a perfect model for any set
of data, are true.
How many models are there for any given set of data? To answer
this, Quine [1951, 1953] put forth his underdetermination thesis, which
is roughly: for any given modelM , there will be an indefinite number of
other models which are not M , but which are equally well supported
by the evidence as M is. This thesis is far from agreed upon [List,
1999, English, 1973, Haack, 2003]. But whether or not it is true, it
is a fact that people have often used different, non-equivalent, models
to explain or predict the same set of observation statements. Then
there is the statement by Kripkenstein that any sequence of numbers
has an infinite number of ways the sequence could have been generated
[Kripke, 1982, Maddy, 1986]—a thesis which, if true, means that each
different way explains and predicts the observed sequence perfectly.
Again, whether that statement is true, it is again a fact that at least
for some sequences, there exists more than one way to generate them.
The conclusion to draw from this is, what may be obvious anyway
[Bernardo and Smith, 2000], that
There are an infinite number of probability models
that can explain any set of data.
(19)
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Now, evidently, for any set of data x1, x2, . . . , xn, (of any dimension-
ality) the model MΩ exists and says, with a straight face, that, with
probability 1, we would have seen just what we saw, namely x1 first, x2
second, and so on (though, conveniently, MΩ never reveals itself until
after the data comes in: it just always says, unconvincingly, and after
the fact, “I knew it!”9). So, an argument for MΩ might be:
MΩ −→ x1, x2, . . . , xn
x1, x2, . . . , xn
MΩ (20)
This is to be read, “If MΩ is true, we will see the data x1, x2, . . . , xn,
which we do in fact see. Therefore, MΩ is true.” This argument is not
valid, but it is inductive and is some evidence for the truth of MΩ in
that sense. It is also an argument, because of the second premiss, only
about the already observed data. It says nothing directly about future
xs, though it can, of course, be applied to them. Our experience with
such ‘over-fitted’ models can be best stated in the following argument:
Of all the many models in the past, simpler ones
usually turned out better than complex ones,
By (15) there is an MΩ, and by (14) there is at
least an M2 6= MΩ,
Complexity(MΩ) > Complexity(M2).
M2 (21)
This argument is invalid but inductive and is, of course, one version
of Occam’s Razor. It is also sufficiently vague because of the terms
‘better’ and ‘complexity.’ The first term certainly does not mean “fits
the data well”, because nothing would ever fit the observed data better
than MΩ, which of course fits without error (where ‘fit’ may be taken
in either the ‘small variance of the parameters’ or in the predictive
sense). It may mean “predicts future data well” (again, it has to be
future data, because MΩ predicts the present data perfectly).
So, ignore, for a moment, the subject of ‘complexity’ and consider
this argument:
9It was real-life examples of unfalsifiable models like MΩ (he mentioned Freudi-
anism and quack medicines as examples) that so (rightly) irritated Popper.
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M2 −→ Score(MΩ) < Score(M2) in future data
Score(MΩ) < Score(M2) in future data
M2 (22)
which is to be read, “If M2 is true, then the prediction score (or nega-
tive measure of loss, or utility, or skill, or whatever, but where higher
scores are better) for MΩ will be less than that for M2. The score was
lower for MΩ, therefore, M2 is true.” This argument is again invalid
and inductive, because no finite set of data, and the score based on
them, would insure with certainty that Score(MΩ) is always less than
Score(M2).
Very well, suppose ‘better’ in (21) means at least “predicts future
data well.” ‘Complexity’ usually means something like “effective num-
ber of parameters” or “dimensionality of θ”, which are close enough for
us here. All this does is change the first premiss of (21) to
Of all the many models in the past, ones with
fewer (effective) parameters usually predict future
data better (give higher scores) than models with
more (effective) parameters.
(23)
The conclusion remains the same, and the argument is still inductive.
Similar to this, the popular model selection criteria AIC and BIC are,
at least partially, based on inductive arguments [Wasserman, 2000].
6. Concluding Remarks
My conclusion, then, by no means original, is that, in general, there
is no formal solution to the problem of model selection. By ‘formal’, I
mean that a procedure that could be followed, in finite time, that would
allow the true model to be deduced, that is, known with certainty,
and would allow incorrect ones to be falsified. Just as important as
the lack of formality is (in the Kripkensteinian sense) that there may
be some set of (two or more) models that explain and predict (any
set of observations) perfectly: so that the only way to judge between
competing models in this set would be to appeal to other, outside
criteria (whatever these may be).
Models are rarely considered in isolation. When deciding on the
truth or falsity of a given model, we often make reference to what this
judgment would mean to our belief in other models. Haack’s [2003]
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crossword puzzle metaphor about how all models fit together in paint-
ing a picture of reality is relevant. One model supplies the answer to,
say, 1 Down, and this answer must be amicable with at least 1 Across,
and so on; the size of the puzzle is large and its boundaries somewhat
amorphous. Just how induction fits in with model selection will be
discussed in future work.
The arguments used in the course of probabilty modeling and model
selection are inductive (mathematical models are found inductively, too
[Polya, 1968]). But the careful reader will have noticed that nowhere
did I attach a probability measure to any of the conclusions of the in-
ductive arguments given above: inductive arguments are not probability
statements. Probabilities can certainy be found for these conclusions—
p(θ|x) and p(xnew|xold) =
∫
p(xnew|θ, xold)p(θ|xold)dθ are common
examples. Of course, all deductive and non-deductive arguments, in-
cluding inductive ones, are matters of logic, so any probability state-
ments about their conclusions must be statements of logical probability
[Jaynes, 2003, Keynes, 2004]. This is an undeveloped area in statistics,
but it is of fundamental importance, because it is directly applicable
to the nature of probability and to what probability models actually
say.
A recent example is a fascinating paper by Wagner [2004] that gives
limits of a probabilized version of modes tollens, which gets at what
people mean when they say ‘practically falsified.’ In that paper (and
in my notation), he shows that if p(q|M) = a and p(¬q) = b, then
p(¬M) → 1 as a, b → 1, and also as a, b → 0. Typically, a = 1, 0 ≤
b < 1, and if so, then b ≤ p(¬M) < 1. Wagner also shows that these
are the best bounds possible.
Falsifiability has also been shown, as it has been in many other places,
to be of little use or interest.
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